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Reassessing the Quality of Government in China
Margaret Boittin
Gregory Distelhorst
Francis Fukuyama1
March 16, 2017
How should the quality of government be measured across disparate national
contexts? This study develops a new approach using an original survey of
Chinese civil servants and a comparison to the United States. We surveyed over
2,500 Chinese officials on two organizational features of their bureaucracies:
meritocracy and individual autonomy. They report greater meritocracy than U.S.
federal employees in almost all American agencies. China's edge is smaller in
autonomy. Differences between the U.S. and China diminish, but do not
disappear, after adjusting for respondent demographics. The meritocracy gap is
also robust to excluding the Chinese respondents most likely to be affected by
social desirability biases. Our findings contrast with numerous indices of good
government that rank the U.S. far above China. They highlight an opportunity to
improve quality of government indices by incorporating surveys of political
insiders.
Keywords: governance indices, quality of government, China, bureaucracy,
authoritarian politics.
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REASSESSING THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT IN CHINA
Assessing the quality of government across different countries is a major conceptual and
empirical challenge. Conceptually, it requires deciding among competing definitions of “quality
government.”

Empirically, it means measuring features of good government in ways that are

comparable across disparate national contexts. A range of quality of government indices have
tackled the conceptual challenge by defining both outcomes that governments should achieve
(e.g. widespread basic education) and the qualities that governments should possess (e.g. limited
bureaucratic red tape).
Measuring and comparing outcomes across countries is difficult but not impossible.
School enrollment statistics can be computed in both Norway and Lesotho. However, measuring
and comparing the qualities of good governments presents a greater challenge. Bureaucratic
processes do not create easily comparable records in the same way as economic development
outcomes, and the de jure practices of bureaucracies as reflected in laws may deviate greatly
from their de facto operations. To meet this challenge, quality of government indices have relied
on external expert judgments about the qualities of governments. For example, the World Bank
Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) methodology uses ratings from the Country Policy and
Institutional Assessments framework in its “government effectiveness” metric. Experts are
asked to rate the internal management of the public bureaucracy on a scale of “little,” “weak,”
“modest,” “moderate,” and “adequate” (World Bank 2015, 43-45). The WGI and other indices
using judgments of external experts provide the foundation for a great volume of cross-national
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research. Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi’s (2009) article summarizing
the WGI has been cited in more than six thousand publications.2
While recognizing the value of existing quality of government indices, we argue that
evaluating government qualities and processes may be improved by incorporating a new source
of information: surveys of public officials. These bureaucratic insiders possess an experiencebased understanding of the bureaucracy and therefore have something unique to offer the
comparative study of government. Their first-hand experiences within government agencies
shed light on invisible processes and understandings that shape the efficacy of organizations.
This study focuses on two organizational features associated with high-quality
government: meritocracy and individual autonomy. We then present an original survey of over
2,500 Chinese civil servants about the organizational features of their workplaces. To ensure
comparability with the United States, we presented Chinese respondents with survey items from
the U.S. Office of Personnel Management’s own survey instrument on the quality of U.S.
government agencies. Our cross-national survey approach resembles that of the World Values
Survey (Inglehart, Basanez, and Moreno 1998), but to our knowledge this is the first study to use
this approach to draw cross-national comparisons of public officials and their organizations.
We use this study to reassess China’s place as reflected in existing quality of government
indices. China has one of the world’s oldest traditions of bureaucratic rule, having pioneered the
use of civil service examinations and merit-based promotion as early as the Former Han Dynasty,
forming the bedrock of centuries of meritocratic recruitment of officials (Elman 2000, 2013;
Fukuyama 2011; Zhao 2015). Yet contemporary indices of high quality government rank China
quite poorly, suggesting these traditions do not extend to the present day (Figure 1). For
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example, the World Bank WGI rank China 67th in government effectiveness and 117th in
regulatory quality, just below Azerbaijan, Cape Verde, and Paraguay. By contrast, the United
States is ranked 22nd and 25th. We use our survey of public officials to explore whether China’s
low rank in existing indices accurately reflects the quality of its bureaucratic processes.

Figure 1: The United States outperforms China on existing quality of government indices
World Bank − Worldwide Governance Indicators
Government Effectiveness
Control of Corruption
Political Stability
Regulatory Quality
Rule of Law
Voice and Accountability
US

World Justice Project − Rule of Law Index
Open Government

China

Regulatory Enforcement
Overall
Univ. of Gothenburg − Quality of Government Institute
Impartial Public Admin
Professional Public Admin
Transparency International
Corruption Perceptions
0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

Percentile rank
Notes. Percentile ranks (100% indicates top percentile, 50% indicates median) for the United
States and China in selected national governance indicators in 2015 or most recently available
prior year.

In examining meritocracy among mid-level bureaucrats, this study also contributes to
research on the career trajectories of Chinese officials. Previous research examines career
trajectories of top local officials and finds evidence of both meritocratic and factional
4

considerations in promotions (Bo 2002; Landry 2008; Landry, Lü, and Duan 2015; Shih, Adolph,
and Liu 2012). Local chief executives and party secretaries are important political leaders, but
they comprise a small proportion of China’s seven million civil servants. We offer new evidence
on meritocratic recruitment and promotion of rank-and-file bureaucrats responsible for daily
government activities, with comparisons to U.S. civil servants.
Finally, this study contributes to scholarship on cross-national comparison of the quality
of government.3 We describe two desirable organizational features for public bureaucracies and
then propose and pilot a method for measuring their presence.

Our use of cross-national

workplace surveys of public officials may be elaborated to measure new bureaucratic features
and be expanded to new countries. Most importantly, we believe this empirical approach allows
for difficult-to-observe qualities of bureaucracy to be compared across countries.
MEASURING AND CONCEPTUALIZING QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT
Numerous indices compare the quality of government across countries. These include the World
Bank’s WGI, Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, the World Justice
Project’s Rule of Law Index, and the Quality of Government Institute’s Expert Survey. 4
Valuable as these indices are, they have been criticized on several points (Andrews 2010;
Fukuyama 2013; Kurtz and Schrank 2007; Thomas 2010). Many provide country-year point
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The concepts “quality of government” and “governance” are contested. For a discussion of
these concepts and alternative approaches to measuring them, see Fukuyama (2013, 2016).
4
World Bank WGI: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home. Transparency
International Corruption Perceptions Index: http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview.
World Justice Project Rule of Law Index: http://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index.
Quality of Government Institute Expert Survey:
http://qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/qogexpertsurveydata. We have excluded indices that
focus on democratic development, such as the Varieties of Democracy Project (https://www.vdem.net/en/) and Freedom House (https://freedomhouse.org/).
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estimates in which a single number represents the aggregated performance of an entire country
for a particular dimension. Such distillation does not recognize how the quality of government
varies within countries, between sectors and ministries, across geographical regions, and
according to level of government (i.e., national, provincial, or local) (Gingerich 2013). Second,
there is disagreement about what these indices should measure.

When evaluating the

performance of a public school system, for example, it is possible to measure government inputs
(e.g., number of teachers hired, school budgets, computers in the classroom), outputs (number of
schools actually built, children matriculated), or outcomes (student performance on standardized
tests, downstream earnings). There is no consensus within academic and policy circles on which
aspects of state quality upon which to focus.
Even when measuring outcomes, it remains unclear how to relate these outcomes back to
the quality of government. For example, China has been a poor performer in environmental
protection and food safety outcomes (Economy 2004; Li and Zhou 2015; Yasuda 2015). Yet this
may be the result of deliberate policy choices to privilege economic growth over the environment
or food safety.

Folding such policy choices into the definition of state quality prevents

investigation of how state quality relates to these outcomes. The policies that a government
pursues cannot simultaneously comprise the definition of good government and be the result of
good government.
Finally, existing quality of government measures rely heavily on surveys that ask
scholars and regional experts to evaluate government quality. In closed political systems like
China’s, experts have limited access to the state and must infer government quality from a
combination of public sources, personal contacts, and observable outcomes. These judgments of
expert observers have been shown to correlate better with announcements of government reform
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than with actual changes in government performance (Andrews 2013). This also renders such
indices difficult to compare over time. Year-on-year changes in the availability of external
evaluations may produce variation even when government quality is unchanged (Arndt and
Romero 2008).
We propose one way to strengthen these indices is to focus on measuring the
organizational features of public bureaucracies. The organizational features of bureaucracy are
conceptually distinct from both the inputs to government and the outcomes of public policy.
Focusing on organizational features rather than public goods outcomes does not penalize
countries that either choose to spend less on certain public goods or are insufficiently productive
to support high levels of public goods provision. Most importantly for our analysis of China,
certain desirable features of bureaucratic organization—such as meritocracy and the autonomy
and engagement of public officials—may obtain in both democratic and authoritarian regimes.
These features may therefore be compared across different regime types. We therefore follow in
the tradition of Peter Evans and James Rauch (1999) and Andrews (2010), both of whom
compare the organizational features of public bureaucracies across countries. We extend this
research by developing a new source of comparative data on these organizational structures:
surveys of civil servants.
Quality of Government in China
Measuring good government and placing it in comparative context is especially
challenging in China. Social scientists studying have previously shed light on many distinctive
features of China’s political system.

These include the nomenklatura system of official

appointments (Kung and Chen 2011; Shih, Adolph, and Liu 2012), “People’s Congress”
legislatures (Manion 2015; O’Brien 1990; Truex 2014), the “one-veto” rule in official
7

performance evaluations (Birney 2014; Edin 2003), and institutions of political repression,
censorship, and propaganda (Deng and O’Brien 2013; Fu 2016; King, Pan, and Roberts 2013).
Although these institutions play important roles in Chinese governance, focusing on what makes
China distinctive makes cross-national comparisons difficult. Recent research on rural elections
and public goods (Mattingly 2016; Sun, Warner, Yang, and Liu 2013; Tsai 2007; Xu and Yao
2015) and local government responsiveness (Chen, Pan, and Xu 2015; Distelhorst and Hou 2014,
2016) offers points of departure for such comparisons. Yet even these studies were not designed
to compare the quality of government in China to other countries.
Contemporary observers therefore remain divided on China’s quality of government.
Some maintain that meritocracy constitutes the essence of modern Chinese rule (Bell 2015; Chin
2011; Xiao and Li 2013). Others emphasize that corruption and patronage pervade the political
system (Pei 2009; Rothstein 2015; Sun 2004), or that party control and factional loyalty
outweigh merit in promotion criteria (Pieke 2009; Shih, Christopher, and Liu 2012).
Two organizational features of bureaucracy
We focus on measuring two “Weberian” aspects of bureaucratic organization. Weberian
qualities are widely understood to underlie good public organizations. Evans and Rauch (1999,
2000) pioneered this approach in a widely-cited survey of 35 countries, and found that Weberian
characteristics were highly correlated with positive development outcomes. The Quality of
Government Institute’s Expert Survey also uses a Weberian characteristic, impartiality, as its
central measure (Rothstein 2011).

The World Bank WGI also acknowledges the role of

Weberian organization in the quality of government (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009).
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Sources that comprise the WGI Government Effectiveness Index 5 , including the Country
Performance and Institutional Assessment reports of the World Bank, African Development
Bank, and Asian Development Bank, use expert judgments to measure meritocracy in
bureaucratic recruitment and promotion.
Rather than elicit judgments of external experts, we collect information from public
officials on two dimensions of Weberian organizations: meritocracy and individual autonomy.
Meritocracy is a system of official recruitment and promotion that recognizes the primacy of
talent and virtue. Meritocracy is a controversial subject, as the individual qualities that constitute
“talents” and “virtues” may reasonably vary by culture, historical period, and organizational
goals. We thus adopt a relatively modest definition, focusing on three features of the bureaucratic
workplace. Officials should obtain their positions based on having relevant skills and abilities
(meritocratic recruitment). They should advance within the bureaucracy according to those
abilities and accomplishments (meritocratic promotion). Finally, because promotions are only
one kind of reward for good performance, officials should also feel subjectively recognized for
good performance of their duties (meritocratic recognition).
We define individual autonomy as the discretion accorded to bureaucrats in
implementing their mandates and their level of engagement in decision-making and problemsolving.

This definition draws on Michael Lipsky’s (1983) and James Wilson’s (1989)

recognition of the role of discretion in public bureaucracy, scholarship on employee engagement
and organizational performance (Harter, Schmidt, and Hayes 2002), and the administrative law
literature on the role of administrative discretion (Mashaw, Merrill, Shane, Magill, Cuellar, and
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The sources of each WGI component can be found at:
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc (Accessed November 20, 2016)
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Parrillo 2014, pp. 755-760).6 Although bureaucracy requires adherence to laws and regulations,
overly rigid work practices may limit the efficacy of public bureaucracies by discouraging the
use of professional knowledge, creativity, and human considerations in the discharge of official
duties (Lipsky 1983).
Individual autonomy and engagement is measured in three ways. First, we ask whether
bureaucrats believe their individual talents are well-utilized in their official positions. Second,
we ask to what extent bureaucrats are encouraged to innovate—applying their own creativity—in
their work practices. Third, we examine whether bureaucrats have opportunities to meaningfully
participate in decision-making, rather than simply following detailed rules or orders from
superiors. By affording individuals the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes
and apply their talents to achieving organizational goals, public organizations may increase
employee effort and benefit from the application of local know-how.
Meritocracy and autonomy do not exhaust the desirable qualities of a public bureaucracy.
Nor do they fully capture the complex “production function” of public sector agencies, which
includes many external factors that are not under agency control (Manning and Shepherd 2016).
However, the desirability of these two features is relatively uncontroversial. World Bank
recommendations to developing countries on motivating and incentivizing civil servants include
the adoption of “merit-based recruitment and promotion.” (World Bank 1997, 81). Although
some may advocate going beyond these Weberian features to measure organizational practices
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Our focus is on individual autonomy rather than the organizational autonomy highlighted by
Evans’ (1995) model of the developmental state or Daniel Carpenter’s (2001) study of American
political development. We do not contest the importance of these forms of bureaucratic
autonomy; these features could plausibly be added to the bureaucratic organization approach to
comparing quality of government.
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associated with the New Public Management (Hood 1995), there remains considerable
disagreement over the extent to which such practices are appropriate in the institutional and
economic context of the developing world (Hughes 2012).
This approach focuses on the organizational features of public institutions, not the
mandates that these bureaucracies seek to implement. We avoid such normative issues not
because they are unimportant, but because we aim to provide information about quality of
government that is independent of these policy choices. By clearly separating the organizational
features of public institutions from the normative objectives associated with democracy and
human rights, we can address issues such as the degree to which state quality affects these and
other development outcomes.
STUDY DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
In contrast to the WGI and other quality of government indices, we attempt to measure these
features through surveys of civil servants rather than judgments of external experts.

The

perceptions of bureaucrats have desirable features in the evaluation of the organizational features
of bureaucracy. First, impressions formed through years of experience may offer unique insights
into bureaucratic practices. Like any workplace, bureaucratic agencies observe many informal
practices that may not appear in formal rules or organizational structure. The individuals most
intimately acquainted with these practices are bureaucrats themselves. The formal credentials of
officials, such as their educational degrees, may obscure less observable dimensions of merit (or
lack thereof) that are apparent to individuals within the organization.

Similarly, formal

institutions that appear to incentivize creative problem-solving may not be effective in practice.
Consider the many workplaces where soliciting suggestions or holding award ceremonies for
innovation are largely ritualistic rather than effective. Divergence between formal rules and
11

informal practices may be particularly widespread in the bureaucracies of developing countries.
On paper, their formal systems frequently resemble those of developed countries.

Yet

informality remains the norm in practice: “[m]erit-based personnel rules are circumvented, and
staff are recruited or promoted on the basis of patronage and clientelism” (World Bank 1997).
Despite these advantages to learning about bureaucratic organization from political
insiders, there are also limitations to this empirical approach. Survey respondents may exhibit
social desirability biases when reporting conditions in their own workplaces. Even in surveys
where respondents are assured anonymity, the social expectation that they will provide positive
evaluations of their work environments may shape responses. As elaborated below, we believe
our survey items are unlikely to activate strong social desirability biases among our respondents
in China. However, we also empirically explore the possibility that social desirability biases
explain our results by analyzing subgroups of the Chinese respondents least likely to exhibit
positive biases, as summarized in the results section.
Surveying public officials in China is challenging. There are no public registries of civil
servants that allow researchers to establish sample frames. Even if researchers could obtain a
sampling frame, official agencies have little political incentive to provide access to researchers,
especially as government agencies have grown more circumspect under a nationwide anticorruption campaign initiated in 2012. To gain entrée into our data collection sites, we therefore
relied on personal connections between Chinese academics and political elites.
We fielded our survey of civil servants in four prefectures, located in southeastern (SE),
southwestern (SW), northwestern (NW), and East Central (EC) China.7 These prefectures were

7

In China, prefectures are the administrative jurisdictions that make up provinces. Prefectures
are composed of subordinate urban districts, counties, and various minority autonomous regions.
12

selected through the personal connections of our survey research partners in China. We might
expect that only exceptionally well-run and successful prefectures would volunteer to participate
in such a study, but the four prefectures in our study are quite ordinary. They rank in the third,
fourth, fifth, and seventh deciles in per capita economic output. In Appendix A, we plot
nationwide decile ranks for 23 demographic, economic, and public goods indicators and find
them nearly uniformly distributed between the second and eighth deciles, with few features
appearing in either tail of the distribution.

This suggests that surveyed prefectures were

relatively ordinary and more likely to be informative of national means than surveys conducted
in China’s provincial capitals, which overwhelmingly occupy the top deciles in population,
economic development, and public goods.
In the absence of authoritative sampling frames, we used a quota-sampling method in
which we attempted to obtain responses from at least 400 civil servants at or above the rank of
deputy section chief (fu keji) at each site. 8 In collaboration with the survey implementation
partner, local contacts arranged for survey participants to complete written surveys under
supervision of survey organization staff. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the sample
and each of the research sites. Respondents were largely men (73%) and overwhelmingly
members of the Communist Party (90%), consistent with research showing that party
membership is an important precondition to advancing in the bureaucracy (Dickson 2014).
Most (71%) worked in administrative agencies, 11% worked in legal institutions (sifa
jiguan), and another 17% worked in legislative institutions like the People’s Congress (PC) or

We anonymize the prefectures sampled in our study to protect the identities of survey
respondents.
8
This sampling approach resembles that used in the Local Governance and Public Goods Survey
(Meng, Pan, and Yang 2015; Yang and Meng 2014), but we focus exclusively on prefectural (not
provincial) officials and survey roughly twice the number of officials.
13

Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). We could not ask individual
respondents which agencies they worked in: our sample included high-ranking local officials and
combining rank and agency information could have compromised anonymity. Instead, we list
government organizations represented in each prefecture (Table 3). Important agencies like the
Prefectural Government Office, Development and Reform Commission, Discipline Inspection
Committee, and CCP Organization Department appear in all four prefectures, as do People’s
Congresses, People’s Courts, Public Security Bureaus, and Prosecutors’ Offices.
Many respondents held positions of authority in the government and Party. One-fifth
held the rank of deputy division chief (fu chuji) and may therefore serve as the deputy heads of
prefectural agencies, such as tax, environmental protection, and housing administration bureaus.
Six percent held the rank of division chief, placing them as leaders of these organizations. At the
next level down, 28% held the rank of section chief and 26% were deputy section chiefs. These
officials serve as directors and vice-directors of departments within the bureaus.9 Another quarter
of the respondents held lower ranks.

9

For example, a municipal tax bureau may have departments in charge of Policy, Tax
Collection, Financial Planning, Statistics, Auditing, and Human Resources. Each department
would be led by an official at the section chief rank.
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Table 2: China Officials Survey (2015-2016) Sample

Demographics
Female
Age (years)
Communist party member
Education
High school and below
Vocational high school
Vocational college
University graduate
Master’s degree
Doctorate
Official rank
Below Deputy Section Chief
Deputy Section Chief
Section Chief
Deputy Division Chief
Division Chief
Above Division Chief
Organization type
Administrative agencies
Legislative (PC, CPPCC)
Justice (courts, prosecutor)
Work experience (years)
Total
In current position
Total respondents

Full
sample

EC

SE

By city
SW

NW

27%
42.4
90%

22%
44.4
92%

23%
41.1
88%

32%
40.9
90%

29%
43.3
89%

0%
1%
12%
74%
12%
0%

0%
1%
14%
72%
12%
0%

1%
0%
7%
71%
21%
0%

0%
1%
8%
80%
10%
0%

0%
2%
19%
73%
6%
0%

26%
20%
28%
20%
6%
1%

13%
14%
23%
33%
13%
3%

21%
30%
30%
17%
2%
0%

34%
17%
29%
18%
3%
0%

34%
20%
30%
11%
4%
0%

71%
17%
11%

72%
21%
7%

69%
14%
18%

80%
15%
5%

64%
19%
17%

21.8
8.1
2,575

24.4
8.5
635

20.4
7.6
568

20.0
7.0
678

22.3
9.2
694
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Table 3: Government and Party Organizations Represented in China Officials Survey
Official respondents in…
All four prefectures

Three prefectures

Two prefectures

One prefecture

Organizations
CCP Prefectural Committee organizations (3):
Discipline Inspection Committee, Organization Department,
Propaganda Department
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)
Development and Reform Commission
Health and Family Planning Commission
People’s Congress
People’s Courts
Prefectural government bureaus (10):
City Planning, Education, Environmental Protection,
Human Resources and Social Security, Public Security, State Land,
Tourism, Transportation, Urban Management, Water Affairs.
Prefectural Government Office
Prosecutor’s Office
All-China Federation of Trade Unions
CCP Prefectural Committee organizations (3):
Prefectural Committee Office, Committee on Politics and Law,
United Front Work Department.
Communist Youth League Committee
Prefectural government bureaus (10):
Civil Affairs, Forestry, Housing and Urban-Rural Development,
Industry and Commerce, Justice, Finance, Quality Inspection,
Safety Inspection, Science and Technology, and Statistics.
Women’s League
Association for Science and Technology
CCP Party School
Civil Air Defense Office
Commission on the Economy and Information Technology
Federation of Disabled Persons
Federation of Industry and Commerce
Federation of Literature and Art
Organization Structure Committee
People’s Bank Local Office
Policy Research Office
Prefectural government bureaus (8):
Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, Archives, Auditing, Food and Drug,
Local Taxation, Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and TV, and Retired
Cadres
Red Cross of China
Reception Office
(49 additional organizations)

Notes. Organizations represented in the China Officials Survey, grouped by the number of
prefectures in which respondents from each organization appeared. In total, 20 organizations
appear in all four prefectures, 16 appear in three prefectures, and 20 appear in two prefectures.
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COMPARING CHINESE AND U.S. CIVIL SERVANTS
How do China’s civil servants evaluate the organizational characteristics of government agencies?
And how do these evaluations compare to bureaucrats in the United States? To enable this
comparison, we selected and translated survey items on meritocracy and individual autonomy
from the U.S. Office of Personnel Management’s Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey
(FedView).10 In the words of the OPM Director in 2015, “[FedView] is a way for us to hear
from our people and respond to their feedback with genuine care and leadership.”11 FedView
survey data underlie public administration research on job satisfaction, diversity, and leadership
in the American bureaucracy (Choi and Rainey 2010; Pitts 2009; Ting 1997, Trottier, Van Wart,
and Wang 2008). FedView’s 2015 survey contains responses from over 421,000 U.S. civil
servants.

We selected six FedView survey items for inclusion in our China survey

corresponding to our dimensions of inquiry: three on meritocracy, and three on autonomy (Table
4).
Before comparing the results from China and the U.S., we examine differences in the
survey samples (Figure 2). We ultimately report raw differences across the two surveys, but we
also use preprocessing techniques to adjust for large differences in respondent demographics.
These adjustments are important if we believe that individual characteristics may bias the
evaluations of civil servants. Women make up a much larger proportion of the U.S. sample (48%)
than our survey of Chinese bureaucrats (27%). Mandated retirement ages in China’s civil service
result in almost no Chinese respondents over 60 years old, compared to 15% of the U.S. sample.

10

For implementation details, see https://www.fedview.opm.gov/2015/.
“OPM Announces Rollout of 2015 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey” URL:
https://www.opm.gov/news/releases/2015/05/fevs-launch-2015-1/ (accessed Mar 15, 2017)
11
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Table 4: U.S. FedView survey items and corresponding China Officials Survey items
FedView, 2015

China Officials Survey, 2015-16

Meritocracy
Recruitment

My work unit is able to recruit
people with the right skills.

Promotion

Promotions in my work unit are
based on merit.

Recognition

How satisfied are you with the
recognition you receive for
doing a good job?

Autonomy
Individual
talents

My talents are used well in the
workplace.

Innovation

I feel encouraged to come up
with new and better ways of
doing things.

Participation

How satisfied are you with your
involvement in decisions that
affect your work?

Notes. Response sets for each question on a five-point Likert scale. For agreement
items the response set was strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, and strongly
disagree. For satisfaction items the response set was extremely satisfied, satisfied,
neutral, dissatisfied and extremely dissatisfied.
A majority of the Chinese officials have Bachelor’s degrees, whereas the U.S. sample is
almost equally distributed among pre-Bachelor’s, Bachelor’s and Postgraduate degrees. The
education level of respondents is likely correlated with both unobservable personal
characteristics, such as family background, and the types of positions individuals hold in the
bureaucracy. For example, individuals with higher levels of formal education are more likely to
occupy positions requiring technical expertise. If those technical positions are systematically
more or less meritocratic than others, this imbalance would bias our comparison.

18

Officials’ ranks may also influence perceptions of meritocracy and autonomy. Indeed, 54%
of supervisors in FedView agree that officials are promoted according to their work performance,
compared to just 29% of non-supervisors. Sorting our Chinese sample into supervisors and nonsupervisors is difficult; the same distinctions are not used in Chinese agencies. Instead, we use
their official ranks as a proxy for supervisory status. Officials at the vice-section chief (fu keji)
rank and below are treated as non-supervisors, and all officials at the rank of section chief (zheng
keji) and above are treated as supervisors. Using this mapping, 73% of the Chinese respondents
are supervisors, compared to just 21% of the FedView respondents.
Finally, service time may influence officials’ attitudes. Long-serving bureaucrats may be
a group that finds life in the bureaucracy particularly rewarding or comfortable, leading to more
positive evaluations.

Alternatively, years of experience may lead to an accumulation of

grievances resulting in more negative evaluations. The Chinese respondents generally had
longer careers in the bureaucracy than their American counterparts, with 63% having worked for
at least 15 years.
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Figure 2: Civil Servant Demographics in China and U.S. (FedView) Surveys
Age
30%

China

20%

FedView
10%

0%
<40

40−49

50−59

60+

Education
60%
China

40%

FedView
20%

0%
Pre−Bachelor's

Bachelor's
Degree

Graduate
Degree

Work experience
60%

40%
China
FedView
20%

0%
0−5 years

6−14 years

15+ years

Notes. Descriptive statistics from our survey of civil servants in China and the 2015 Federal
Employee Viewpoint Survey. Note that the U.S. public use data file bins these features into the
groups shown in the figures.
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Balancing samples on respondent characteristics
The differences highlighted above suggest that sample composition may bias the
comparison between the U.S. and China surveys. We therefore present both raw comparisons
and comparisons on reweighted samples in which China and U.S. respondents exhibit similar
demographic profiles on average.12
To balance the China and U.S. samples on observable characteristics, we assign new
analytic weights to survey respondents using entropy balancing (Hainmueller 2012). This preprocessing technique re-weights each observation such that the moments (means, variances, and
skewness) of selected variables are nearly equivalent across the two samples. Since the FedView
public use data file is binned (e.g. ages in ten-year increments, rather than continuous numbers),
we use each of the above categories as a binary variable in the entropy balancing process. Table
4 shows that the balancing procedure equalizes the sample means (and thus the variances and
skewness, since each variable is binary) of the respondent characteristics discussed above. To
ensure that our results are not idiosyncratic to this pre-processing technique, we also present
comparisons using exact matching on these binary features (Blackwell, Iacus, King, and Porro
2009). Balancing on observable characteristics is not a cure-all. Even perfect balance through
matching or other pre-processing techniques on observable features cannot exclude the
possibility that factors other than the features of the bureaucratic workplace bias our estimates of

12

Note that these adjustments may introduce some biases to the comparison of organizational
features. For example, if one bureaucratic organization has higher numbers of supervisors, which
results in greater autonomy, then rebalancing the samples such that they have equal numbers of
supervisors would disadvantage the organization with superior autonomy. In our case, the China
sample has a greater proportion of supervisors, so these adjustments may downward bias our
estimates of bureaucratic autonomy in China.
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the differences between the Chinese and U.S. bureaucratic workplace. However, correcting for
these imbalances is likely to reduce bias introduced by the differences in the two samples.
Table 4: Covariate balance in China and U.S. civil servant samples

Female
Supervisor
Age
<40 yo
40-49
50-59
60+
Education
Pre-Bachelor's
Bachelor's Degree
Graduate degree
Work experience
0-5 years
6-14 years
15+ years

Original samples
China
U.S.
27%
48%
74%
21%

After reweighting
China
U.S.
27%
27%
75%
75%

37%
37%
26%
0%

22%
27%
36%
15%

37%
37%
26%
0%

37%
37%
26%
0%

14%
74%
12%

31%
34%
35%

13%
75%
12%

13%
75%
12%

9%
28%
63%

19%
36%
45%

9%
28%
63%

9%
28%
63%

Notes. Samples reweighted using entropy balancing (Hainmueller 2012) on the listed variables.
Each variable is a dummy (0, 1) binned according to the FedView 2015 public use dataset.
https://www.fedview.opm.gov/2015/EVSDATA/ (accessed May 22, 2016)
Results
How do the views of Chinese officials compare to those of U.S. bureaucrats? Results in
Figure 3 illustrate two patterns. First, Chinese civil servants consistently rated their workplace as
superior in meritocracy and individual autonomy compared to U.S. civil servants. Second, the
gap shrinks after adjusting for the observable characteristics of respondents. However, the
difference remains statistically significant in every U.S-China comparison.
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Figure 3: Chinese bureaucrats report higher levels of meritocracy and autonomy

Meritocracy
Recruitment

Promotion

Recognition
US
US (Matched)
US (Balanced)

Individual Autonomy

China

Indiv. talents

Innovation

Participation

0

1

2

3

Mean agreement/satisfaction score

Notes. Mean responses from surveys of Chinese and U.S. civil servants (FedView). Each
question offered a five-point Likert scale of agreement or satisfaction, with 0 corresponding to
the most negative response and 4 corresponding to the most positive. Samples are balanced
using entropy balancing (Hainmueller 2012) on respondent gender, age, supervisory status,
experience in government, and education. Also shown are results after matching the samples on
the same covariates using the exact matching algorithm implemented in Blackwell et al. (2009).
The substantive significance of the gap varies by item. The most dramatic difference
between the two samples is in meritocratic recruitment.

After balancing the samples on

observables, the mean response of Chinese civil servants still exceeds that of U.S. bureaucrats by
0.63 to 0.70 units on the five-point agreement scale. On the other hand, the estimated gap for
opportunities to use your talents in the workplace is relatively small, ranging from 0.09 to 0.16
units.
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Addressing Social Desirability Bias Concerns
Even after adjusting for respondent demographics, one concern is that stronger social
desirability biases among Chinese officials explain the observed differences between the U.S.
and China. Research on Chinese censorship suggests that the repressive apparatus is more
concerned about collective action than speech that criticizes government policies and efficacy
(King, Pan, and Roberts 2013), and previous survey research on public opinion in China finds
that respondents are more likely to select the non-response category rather than report a biased
response (Stockman 2013, 46-47). Nonetheless, it is possible that Chinese officials exhibit
greater restraint in expressing criticism of government agencies, even in an anonymous survey.
One approach to dealing with social desirability biases is to use randomized survey
methods such as item-count techniques or endorsement experiments. We declined to use these
techniques because the U.S. FedView survey does not contain comparable survey items. Instead,
we perform a series of robustness checks that exclude Chinese respondents most likely to exhibit
social desirability biases. First, our main findings on meritocracy and autonomy are robust to
excluding all high-ranking officials (27% of respondents) or excluding all Communist Party
members (90% of respondents) (Appendix B, Figures B5-B6).
We then use other survey questions to identify subgroups of Chinese officials that
demonstrate willingness to express socially undesirable viewpoints. We first examine only
Chinese officials who express a negative view of China’s signature economic achievement of the
late 20th century: economic reform and breakneck growth. They agree with the assertion that a
small number of people have monopolized the benefits of Chinese reform, and that, “the vast
majority of citizens have not benefited.” A somewhat surprising 40% of officials agreed with
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this negative view of economic reform in China. Among them, our results for meritocracy
remain, and the Chinese advantage in autonomy becomes weaker (Figure B7).
As a final robustness check, we examine the even smaller subgroup of officials (10%)
who support the right of artwork “to defame national leaders and founding fathers of China.”
Even among these iconoclastic respondents, China maintains its advantage in meritocratic
recruitment, promotion, and recognition (Figure 4). In participation in decision-making, and
using talents and knowledge, the U.S. and China are statistically indistinguishable after adjusting
for respondent observable characteristics within this subgroup.
Figure 4: Robustness—Officials Permissive of Artwork Defaming China’s Founding Fathers

Meritocracy
Recruitment

Promotion

Recognition
US
US (Balanced)
China (unpopular opinion)

Individual Autonomy
Indiv. talents

Innovation

Participation

0

1

2

3

Mean agreement/satisfaction score

Notes. Mean responses from surveys of Chinese and U.S. (FedView) civil servants. Replication
of Figure 3 examining only Chinese officials who agree that artworks may defame China’s
national leaders and founding fathers. China respondents in this subsample: 280.

25

In summary, China’s advantage in organizational meritocracy persists after removing all
high-ranking officials, excluding all Chinese Communist Party members, and including only the
officials for whom we have behavioral evidence of their willingness to express socially
undesirable opinions. In this last subgroup, the mean level of autonomy is estimated to be at
parity with the U.S. means after adjusting for respondent observable characteristics. Even within
this subgroup expressing socially undesirable opinions, we detect no evidence that that they
perceive lower individual autonomy than the average U.S. federal civil servant.

Comparisons to U.S. Federal Agencies
To provide greater context, we compare Chinese civil servants to civil servants in various
U.S. agencies. The following figures present these comparisons for one item each from
meritocracy and autonomy (for the remaining items, see Appendix B). In meritocratic
recruitment, where the Chinese sample exhibits the largest advantage, none of the U.S. agencies
outperform the Chinese sample (Figure 5).

However, four federal agencies—the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Department of Education,
and the Office of Personnel Management (which implements the FedView survey)—have ratings
that are statistically indistinguishable from the Chinese sample.

At the bottom end, the

Department of Homeland Security averages nine-tenths of a point lower on the agreement scale.
However, when we examine bureaucrats’ satisfaction with participation in decision-making
processes—an indicator of autonomy—several agencies outperform the Chinese sample (Figure
6). The Chinese respondents fall closer to the middle of the pack.

26

Figure 5: Meritocratic Recruitment in US Federal Agencies vs. China
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Meritocratic recruitment, US vs. China
Notes. Estimated differences in mean response to meritocratic recruitment survey item in US
federal agencies compared to China survey. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. Each
federal agency subsample balanced on observables using entropy balancing. US agencies with
fewer than 600 respondents not displayed.
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Figure 6: Participation in decision-making (autonomy) in US Federal Agencies vs. China
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Notes. Estimated differences in mean response to participation in decision-making (autonomy
battery) survey item in US federal agencies compared to China survey. Error bars show 95%
confidence intervals. Each federal agency subsample balanced on observables using entropy
balancing. US agencies with fewer than 600 respondents not displayed.
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CONCLUSION
In many existing quality of government indices, such as the World Bank WGI, China is a laggard
in comparison to the United States (Figure 1). The WGI indicator on government effectiveness
places China at the 67th percentile, whereas the United States is at the 90th percentile. Yet the
testimony of political insiders presented above—civil servants in the United States and China—
tells a different story. Chinese officials provide systematically higher evaluations of their public
organizations surrounding both meritocracy and autonomy.

The large gap in meritocracy

persists after performing adjustments for demographic composition and even when examining
small samples of Chinese officials that express other socially undesirable views. While the
individual autonomy gap shrinks to statistical insignificance in these subgroups, we find no
evidence of a U.S. advantage.

However, certain U.S federal agencies achieve parity or

outperform the Chinese sample.
Compared to the quality of government indices summarized in Figure 1, our main survey
finding may appear unusual. Officials in a developing, authoritarian country were more likely,
on average, to characterize their workplace as having Weberian qualities than officials in an
advanced western democracy. Yet on further consideration this is less surprising. China’s civil
service is a highly sought-after profession, whereas bureaucrats are not broadly admired in
American political culture. Even when China experienced a decline in civil service applicants in
2015, there were still 1.4 million candidates, or roughly 50 for each available post.13 This results
in an acceptance rate lower than any Ivy League university. Such intense competition for

13

“Applications for civil service exam drop as companies beckon.” The China Daily. October
28, 2015. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-10/28/content_22300964.htm (accessed
November 23, 2016).
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Chinese civil service posts may explain why Chinese officials report their workplaces to be more
meritocratic than U.S. civil servants do. The finding that Chinese officials experience greater
individual autonomy and engagement can also be understood by considering the context in
which bureaucrats operate across these countries. Scholars have argued that the U.S. system of
separated powers breeds legalistic behavior and low autonomy as bureaucrats try to shield
themselves from an adversarial political process that reaches deep into executive branch
implementation (Wilson 1989). Chinese bureaucrats, by contrast, come from a tradition in which
they are accustomed to governing. The high level of human capital generated by meritocratic
recruitment may also enable the high levels of engagement and participation that our survey
finds.
The differences between our findings and quality of government indicators that rely on
expert surveys raise questions about the appropriate basis of cross-national comparisons of
quality of government.

Are the organizational features that support good government

undervalued in expert opinions? Does a focus on government outputs—or a preference for
democratic institutions—obscure the presence of high-quality organizations and processes the
governments of some developing countries? This study aims to raise these questions about
measuring the quality of government and to highlight the value of exploiting new sources of
information to answer them.
These results also raise questions about the usefulness of summarizing a country’s quality
of government using a single country-year point estimate. Although the estimated mean ratings
among Chinese bureaucrats are greater than the mean ratings among U.S. bureaucrats for all six
indicators we examine, several U.S. federal agencies outperform the Chinese sample. Civil
servants at NASA, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Securities and Exchange
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Commission (SEC), and the Department of Education consistently rate their workplaces at or
above the levels of our Chinese officials. The numerous respondents in Homeland Security and
the Veterans’ Administration (VA) drag down the mean estimates of government quality among
U.S. civil servants.
There are also important limitations to this study. Political considerations in China led to
non-random sampling of both jurisdictions and individuals. While the jurisdictions selected are
reasonably ordinary, we have no methodological guarantee that the sample of officials we draw
is statistically representative of the population.

In addition, it is important to note that

perceptions of meritocracy may deviate from actual practice in important ways.

There is

evidence that organizations perceived to be more “meritocratic” in fact exhibit higher levels of
gender bias (Castilla and Benard 2010). Finally, while we perform several subgroup analyses to
address the possibility that the U.S.-China gap is inflated by social desirability biases, future
research may employ alternative techniques such as item-count experiments to elicit potentially
socially undesirable opinions from Chinese civil servants.
We also assume that the organizational features we selected underlie good governance.
Although we believe this to be true for the features we selected—meritocracy and individual
autonomy—recent research questions whether Weberian bureaucracy is indeed the right recipe
for countries in economic transition. Yuen Ang (2016) argues that some practices scorned by
Weber, such as opportunities for officials to collect “gray income” through political connections,
may support development and the successful transition to a market economy. In a similar vein,
Andrews (2010) argues that even among advanced economies there is significant heterogeneity
in the organizational features of good government.
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It is also important not to over-interpret the China-U.S. comparison in terms of its
implications for the relative quality of the “China model” when compared to western democracy.
We deliberately focused on the Weberian characteristics of government and excluded
consideration of values like adherence to law, respect for individual rights, and responsiveness to
citizen demands, all of which must be considered when evaluating an entire political system,
rather than solely the quality of a bureaucracy. A Weberian bureaucracy can be ruthlessly
efficient in censoring the media or jailing dissidents. In addition, the comparison is obviously a
snapshot of two systems at a particular point in time. Had the same survey been conducted
during the Cultural Revolution, when Mao sought to dismantle and demoralize the bureaucracy,
China would have fared much worse. Previous generations of American bureaucrats would
likely have rated themselves much more highly. Scholars of US public administration have
noted that bureaucratic quality has been under increasing stress in recent decades, that the work
force is aging and demoralized, and that Congress has deliberately stripped the bureaucracy of its
capacity (Light 2008; Volcker 2003). None of this necessarily speaks to the long-term qualities
of the political system.
The primary goal of this research is to introduce new cross-national comparative
evidence on the organizational features of bureaucracy and to recommend its incorporation into
quality of government indices. The organizational features that we measure through surveys of
civil servants could be combined with expert characterizations of other structural variables in
national governments, as pursued by Evans and Rauch (1999). To further this comparative
endeavor, we hope that similar civil servant surveys will be replicated in other large, complex
countries in the future. It would contribute to our knowledge of governance if researchers could
standardize survey instruments across different countries, much as the US General Social Survey
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became the basis for the World Values Survey (Inglehart 1995). If such a survey can be done in
a large authoritarian country like China, it could certainly be carried out in other, more open
societies.
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APPENDIX A: SAMPLED PREFECTURES
The four prefectures sampled in this study were selected according to where our local
research partners could secure access to large numbers of municipal officials. We are therefore
concerned that these jurisdictions may be exceptional and unrepresentative of Chinese
administrative jurisdictions on the whole. To investigate this question, we computed the decile
ranks of sampled prefectures among all Chinese prefectures in available economic and
demographic indicators. Appearing in the tenth decile means that the prefecture lies between the
90th and 100th percentile for that characteristic.

All data come from the 2014 Statistical

Yearbook of the Regional Economy (China Statistics Press), which reports indicators for 2013.
Rather than report decile ranks for each of the four prefectures, which yields statistical signatures
that may permit their identification, we report the four-prefecture average decile ranks in Table
A1.1 and offer brief qualitative descriptions of each prefecture below.
Southeast (SE) is a middle-income prefecture with a high proportion of private sector
employers. Despite being relatively populous and export reliant, its economic output per capita
is near the national median. Its economic composition is tilted toward the primary and service
sectors, but industrial output is not far below the median. Although government revenue is
above the median, expenditures per capita are again near the national median.
Southwest (SW) is a more industrialized prefecture on the interior with a population near
the national median. Its economic output per capita is slightly below the median, and it has
higher shares of primary and secondary sector economic output.

Compared to the other

prefectures in our sample, it has low exposure to the international economy.
Northwest (NW) is a poorer rural prefecture, ranking at the high end of the distribution of
rural households and share of primary sector economic output. Industry contributes relatively
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little to economic output, and it ranks low in per capita GDP. The government collects low
revenue per capita, but ranks high in expenditures per capita. Its public health resources are
relatively weak, with low ranks in doctors and hospital beds per capita.
East Central (EC) is our most economically developed prefecture. It appears in the upper
half of per capita economic output. It is also geographically compact with a high population
density.

EC is among the most industrialized prefectures in China, with a large share of

secondary sector economic output.
Table A1 shows that the average rank of these four prefectures in a variety of economic
and demographic features is close to the national median. Figure A1 displays the distribution of
87 decile ranks computed (five data points for surveyed prefectures were missing). We find
relatively few extreme ranks in the tails. 13 indicators rank in the first or second deciles, and
another six rank in the ninth or tenth deciles. The remaining 74 ranks (85%) fall between the
third decile and eighth decile of the national distribution. The average decile rank across all
comparisons is 5.3, suggesting that in aggregate these four prefectures are relatively ordinary.
Comparing the four sample prefectures to well-known prefectures in China illustrates
how exceptional most well-known cities in China are. Take, for example, the coastal city of
Shenzhen, China’s export manufacturing hub. It is one of the geographically most compact
prefectures in China, and ranks in the top decile for 13 of the indicators we examine, including
total GDP, per capita GDP, imports, exports, cars, mobile subscribers, and doctors. Even less
well-known provincial capital cities are quite extraordinary. The capital of Hunan province,
Changsha, ranks in the top decile for nine of the indicators we examine, including GDP and per
capita GDP. Despite non-random selection, our sample is relatively ordinary among Chinese
prefectures in terms of demographics and economics.

41

Reassessing the Quality of Government in China
Online Supplement
Table A1: Average decile ranks of surveyed prefectures compared to large prefectures

Indicator

Four surveyed prefectures

Reference: large prefectures

Average decile rank

Nanjing Changsha Shenzhen Urumqi

Land area (sq km)

4

3

5

1

6

Population

6

10

9

10

6

Population density

7

10

8

10

5

Rural households (%)

7

1

5

.

1

GDP

6

10

10

10

8

Per capita GDP

5

10

10

10

9

Primary sect. GDP (%)

6

1

2

1

1

Secondary sect. GDP (%)

6

3

8

3

2

Tertiary sect. GDP (%)

4

10

8

10

10

Private sector empl (%)

6

10

6

10

.

Import share of GDP

5

10

7

10

7

Export share of GDP

5

9

6

10

9

FDI share of GDP

7

9

9

8

3

Per cap. rural disposable income

6

10

10

.

8

Per cap. urban disposable income

4

10

10

10

4

Per cap. government revenue

5

10

10

10

10

Per cap. government exp.

5

9

8

10

9

Highways per km2 land area

6

9

8

5

2

Cars per capita

4

9

10

10

.

Mobile subscribers per cap.

5

9

10

10

10

Broadband connections per cap.

7

9

8

9

9

Doctors per capita

4

9

10

8

10

Hospital beds per capita

4

8

10

1

10
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Figure A1 Decile ranks of surveyed prefecture economic and social characteristics

Frequency
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Decile ranks of surveyed prefectures

Notes. Histogram shows the distribution of decile ranks for all indicators listed in Table A1.1 for
our four surveyed prefectures. 87 ranks shown in total, as five data points were missing.
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APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL FIGURES
Figures B1-B4. Estimated differences in mean response to survey items in US federal agencies compared to China survey. Error bars
show 95% confidence intervals. Each federal agency subsample is balanced on respondent observables using entropy balancing. US
agencies with fewer than 600 respondents are not displayed.

Figure B1: Meritocratic promotion
in US Federal Agencies vs. China
NASA
Education
OPM
Nuclear Reg Comm
SEC
Commerce
GSA
Labor
Health & HS
(Unknown)
Social Security
USAID
EPA
Transportation
Energy
VA
Justice
Treasury
DoD 4th Estate
Army
HUD
Navy
Interior
State
Air Force
Agriculture
Homeland Security
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Figure B3: Use of individual talents (autonomy)
in US Federal Agencies vs. China
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Figure B4: Innovation is rewarded (autonomy)
in US Federal Agencies vs. China
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Figure B5 Robustness—Excluding High-Ranking Officials in China
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Notes. Mean responses from surveys of Chinese and U.S. (FedView) civil servants. Replication
of Figure 3 after excluding all Chinese officials at and above the rank of vice-division chief (fu
chuji). China respondents in this subsample: 2,109.
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Figure B6 Robustness—Excluding Communist Party Members
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Notes. Mean responses from surveys of Chinese and U.S. (FedView) civil servants. Replication
of Figure 3 after excluding all Chinese officials who are members of the Communist Party.
China respondents in this subsample: 270.
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Figure B7 Robustness—Only Officials Expressing Negative View on China’s Reform
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Notes. Mean responses from surveys of Chinese and U.S. (FedView) civil servants. Replication
of Figure 3 examining only Chinese officials expressing the opinion that China’s economic
reform has not benefited the large majority of Chinese citizens. China respondents in this
subsample: 1,127.
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